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Abstract This paper studies a single product setting in which a firm can be sourced from multiple
suppliers. One supplier has an unreliable capacity,while others are reliable but have lower product quality.
The addressed context is disruptions due to sanctions, which cause failure in supply from unreliable
sources. The important question which emerges here is, ‘‘how should companies use different strategies
of single/dual/multiple sourcing to handle those potential disruptions?’’ In this paper, these strategies
are addressed and compared, when the demand is sensitive to price and the level of supply risk. Dual
sourcing provides the firmwith the opportunity of rerouting (from a lowquality supplier) after disruption.
However, problems of monopoly rise after the disruption, and the buying firm lose bargaining power.
Whereas, in triple sourcing, the setup cost could be higher, after the disruption, there would still be
competition between two suppliers, and the price would not increase unreasonably. The main focus of
the current work is on defining the share of each supplier, and finding suitable sourcing policies (single,
dual or triple) to be applied to different probabilities of disruption. The proposed model is applied in the
decision making process of a studied supply chain in the automotive industry.
© 2012 Sharif University of Technology. Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V.
Open access under CC BY license.1. Introduction
Uncertainty (generally termed ‘‘risk’’) constitutes an in-
evitable part of supply chain management. Industrial compa-
nies depend on a range of up-stream resources that lie outside
their control. Furthermore, managers have only incomplete in-
formation about their sources of supply, which makes the pur-
chasing process more risky. The reported dramatic outcomes of
risky events shed light on the importance of proactively man-
aging supply chain risk [1–3].
Juttner [4] emphasized supply chain risk classifications,
derived from their sources and consequences. Among the
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Open access under CC BY license.supply chain risk types are disruptions that result from natural
disasters, labor disputes, supplier bankruptcy, acts of war and
terrorism [5]. Disruption risks generally have low probability
and potential for great loss. Some papers refer to these as
‘‘catastrophic events’’ [2]. These risks can seriously disrupt or
delaymaterial, information and cash flow,which can spoil sales,
increase costs or both.
While a significant amount of research has been reported in
the area of the supply chain concept, there has been relatively
little research [6–8] conducted in the important area of supply
chain disruptions and their impacts [9]. How a company copes
with such threats depends on the type of disruption and the
organization’s level of preparedness [10]. It is even highly
sensitive to its development and sourcing policy, whether it
works at a global level or it is limited to local partners [11].
Supply chains may apply divergent approaches to manage
disruptions. They can secure their supply chain [12], develop
resiliency [13] to perform recovery plans immediately after
disruption, or modify inventory management policies [14] to
decrease the effects of disruptions. Along these lines, Lee and
Wolfe [15] presented strategies for reducing vulnerability to
security losses that may cause disruptions. Kleindorfer and
Saad [16] introduced a conceptual framework to estimate and
reduce the effects of disruptions. Norrman and Jansson [3]
studied a fire accident at Ericsson Inc.’s sub-supplier and the
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company’s solution for mitigating the likelihood of such an
event as a proactive plan. Tang [17] proposed robust strategies
for mitigating disruption effects, and Pochard [10] discussed
an empirical solution based on dual-sourcing to mitigate the
likelihood of disruptive events. Marley [18] discussed lean
management, integrative complexity and tight coupling, as
well as their relationships with disruption effects. Researchers
addressed differentmitigation [10,17–20] and contingency [21]
strategies for reducing the impacts of supply disruptions. But,
the problem is lethal when a single source of the firm is
disrupted and can no longer continue its role.
When there is a low probability of failure for a supplier, it
is reasonable to work with it, but the working environment is
dynamic, and a supplier with acceptable reliability in the past
may face serious problemswhich prevent it fromdelivery in the
future.
For instance, the global financial crisis contributed to the
failure of key businesses, decline in consumerwealth estimated
in trillions of US dollars, substantial financial commitments
incurred by governments, and a significant drop in economic
activities [22] which caused declarations of bankruptcy by
even major companies [23]. Another specific situation caused
by political issues is when companies in different countries
are banned from cooperating and doing business with each
other. This situation, called sanctions, is the context of this
paper. Hence, the supplier is not allowed to be in contact
with the manufacturer. But this process is not based on a
sudden event; the probability of supplier failure is very low
in natural situations, but after the rise of political problems,
one possible reaction of countries is imposing sanctions
which causes serious problems in supplier-buyer relationships.
Sometimes sanctions are launched by a third country that
has enough economic power to hinder companies in a second
country from doing business with companies in the sanctioned
country. After the specific political problems, the probability
of supplier failure due to sanctions grows rapidly and buyers
should make decisions on how to continue sourcing after
disruption (Figure 1). In this case, a disruption with very low
probability and tremendous impact becomes a disruption with
high probability and significant influence in a short period of
time, which is the critical time for decision making. Of course,
as the occurrence of sanctions is still a probabilistic event,
even after a sharp increase in its likelihood, it is possible that
politicians may reach an agreement and the problem will be
solved, so the probability will fall down after it peaks. Hence,
the decision making becomes more crucial.
A similar problem is the situation of supplier bankruptcy;
before bankruptcy declaration, the probability of supplier
failure can be estimated and if the buyer is aware, it can plan
a substitute supply policy.Researchers have considered sourcing decisions in divergent
ways including procedures of decision making on in-sourcing
and out-sourcing [24], off-shore and near-shore [11] and the
number of sources [25–27].
Although single sourcing improves communication due to a
close buyer-seller relationship and could cause lower costs as
a consequence of economy of scale [28], the uncertainty of a
specific buying-selling situation makes dual/multiple sourcing
a reasonable strategy [25,26]. But it is crucial to find out with
which level of uncertainty the supply chain should shift to
dual/multiple sourcing [29,30]. One of themain contributions of
this paper is to answer this question, which will help managers
make strategic decisions in an appropriate time.
This paper studies a single product setting in which a firm
can source from multiple suppliers. One supplier has the risk
of failure and unreliable capacity, while other suppliers are
reliable but have lower product quality. The addressed context
(where a case study has been made) is disruptions due to
sanctions that have caused failure for an Iranian automotive
manufacturer in receiving supplies fromanunreliable European
source. The important question which emerges here is, ‘‘How
should companies use different strategies of single/dual/triple
sourcing to handle those potential disruptions?’’ Previous
studies represented the idea of dual sourcing as a mitigation
strategy [10] and rerouting as a contingency strategy [21], but
in their study, disruption did not last until the end of the study
horizon; while in this research, sanctions are rare but long
disruptions, and influence strategic decisions. In addition, the
probability of sanctions in routine situations is really low, but
in special circumstances it rises, so decision making should be
done if this growth of probability occurs.
In this paper, two possible strategies which are dual and
triple sourcing are addressed and compared. Dual sourcing
provides the firm with the opportunity of rerouting (supplied
by a low quality Far-East supplier) after disruption. However,
problems ofmonopoly rise after disruption, and the buying firm
loses bargaining power. In this situation, the remaining supplier
could increase/renegotiate the prices due to amonopoly (which
has been seen in the case study). Whereas in triple sourcing,
the setup cost could be higher due to an additional supplier,
after the disruption, there would still be competition between
two remaining suppliers and the price would not increase
unreasonably.
Further, already when asking for future prices, the buyer
could screen the proposed prices offered for non-sanction and
sanction scenarios and for potential renegotiation closures. The
scenarios of being one of two versus three suppliers would
probably impact the suppliers’ offers.
The main focus of the current work is to define the
share to give each supplier, and define which sourcing policy
(single, dual or triple) be applied to different probabilities of
disruption. It is noted that, if the company reroutes its supply
to alternative suppliers, they may not provide the buyer with
its whole demand, because they should increase production
capacity, which faces limitations. Consequently, the step of
calculating the supply share before disruption is followed with
investigating supply share after disruption. The above decisions
are made to minimize the long-run average cost and, in both
options, the main costs are categorized into set-up, ordering,
quality and lost order. Research questions are defined as ‘‘For
which probabilities of disruption, single/dual/triple sourcing
strategy would be more cost effective and what is the share of
each supplier?’’
Following items highlight this research in comparison to
previous work in the field of supply chain disruption:
H. Davarzani et al. / Scientia Iranica, Transactions E: Industrial Engineering 18 (2011) 1517–1528 1519• Integrating price and risk sensitivity of demand.
• Reflecting the concepts of quality and lost orders to cost, in
order to facilitate a comparison between available options.
• Addressing specific features of sanctions in the proposed
models.
• Clarifying application of triple sourcing in practice as an
optimal solution.
The remaining parts of this article are organized as follows:
Section 2 introduces the proposed model which is illustrated
in Section 3 by an empirical study. Then in Section 4, sensitivity
analysis and practical implications of the model are shown to
make decisions on optimal disruption management strategies.
Finally, the paper concludes with a brief summary in section
five.
2. Proposed model
The main focus of this paper is on defining the share of each
supplier that minimizes total expected cost, when the buyer
chooses dual or triple sourcing strategy. Although the goal
function seems to be just theminimization of expected cost, the
proposedmodel translates responsiveness and quality issues to
cost, in order to show the trade-off between procurement cost
and responsiveness, and makes this possible to calculate and
discuss. It is one of themain concerns of companies to transform
all intangible issues to tangible information and especially to
cost. This conversion helps them compare different options
based on their outcomes, even though they may serve different
purposes. Under all conditions, the main costs are categorized
as:
• C1—Ordering cost: The cost of buying parts from suppliers
based on different unit-price of each supplier.
• C2—Quality cost: One assumption is the lower quality of
alternative sources which imposes additional quality cost.
So in this study, if the whole demand is supplied by the first
source, the base quality cost is zero. Otherwise, based on
the amount of supplied parts from alternative suppliers, this
cost will be calculated. The effect of low quality is generally
on the amount of broken parts and reworking, so it has a
linear relation with the number of products. Consequently,
based on this ratio and part price, it is possible to assign
a cost as a quality cost to each part. Transforming the
concept of quality to cost facilitates the comparison between
different suppliers according to their suggested prices and
quality.
• C3—Lost order cost: Based on the assumption of this work,
all unmet demands are lost orders. Lost orders are two types,
(a) unmet demand due to under-estimation of demand, (b) a
result of lack of material due to problems of disruption. The
first type is the same in all sourcing policies and is based on
the ordering policy and deciding the amount of order in each
period, so it would not be entered in model. But the cost
of the second circumstance is calculated. Higher amounts
of lost orders reflect lower levels of responsiveness. In this
paper, the responsiveness has been converted to cost, based
on the imposed cost of lost orders.
• C4—Set up cost: The more the suppliers, the more the
imposed set-up cost. In this paper, the imposed set-up cost
has a linear relationwith the number of suppliers. So, adding
a new source/supplier imposed a fixed cost as set-up cost.
This cost includes negotiation cost, transaction cost, tooling
cost, etc.
• C—Total cost: summation of C1, C2, C3 and C4.In this model, the firm operates during a single period of
contract (multi ordering period), with complete lost orders
for unmet demand, where there is constraint on the flexible
capacity of the alternative suppliers, because the maximum
capacity of an alternative supplier might be less than the total
demand, or it cannot reach its maximum capacity immediately
after disruption. In a previous work by the authors [31], this
problem has been investigated without capacity constraint.
Moreover, the addressed model assumes that demand is
sensitive to the offered price of suppliers. So, the buyer plans
for the demand (we call it expected demand in this paper) and
the offered prices may change the actual order, based on the
formulation of demand sensitivity to price.
In all sourcing strategies of this paper, the following
parameters exist:
Dex: Expected demand per ordering period;
Dmax: Maximum possible demand per ordering
period due to warehousing and production
limitations;
Dav: Actual average demand per ordering
period;
b: The cost of lost orders at the end of a
period per unit;
q: The imposed quality cost if the firm
supplies from alternative suppliers per
unit;
F : Set-up cost for each supplier;
π1: Probability of disruption in a period;
π0 = 1− π1: Probability of having a period without
disruption;
[x]+: The first integer number, which is greater
or equal to x;
c¯: Average part price during the contract
period;
c0: The minimum possible price of a part
according to its previous records;
µ: Price sensitivity factor which is calculated
based on the ratio of average offered
prices to the minimum possible price:
µ = c¯ − c0
c0
. (1)
The firm has one unreliable supplier, which may fail due to a
disruption caused by sanctions, and if it goes down, it will never
be available within the time horizon of planning. There are also
some alternative suppliers that offer the same parts with less
quality. The low quality causes some re-working and increases
defective parts. Hence, it imposes additional cost, in comparison
with the base cost of the unreliable source. In the following sub-
sections, three options of sourcing will be illustrated.
2.1. Single sourcing
The primal sourcing strategy in this study is single sourcing,
and this section presents the long-run average cost of single
sourcing from each supplier (reliable and unreliable). Part
prices supplied from each supplier are defined as follows:
cu: Part price, supplied from the first source
(which is an unreliable source)
cr : Part price, supplied from the second source
(which is a reliable source with lower
quality).
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of orders during the whole period of the contract, although
one contract period consists of several ordering periods, which
should be clarified in advance. As mentioned earlier, the buyer
estimates its ordering amount ahead of settling a contract.
But, the actual demand is sensitive to the offered prices. As
the demand may increase due to price decrease, and since
the production and warehouse capacity are limited, maximum
acceptable demand (Dmax) should be determined. The general
formulation of this sensitivity is based on Eq. (2), where
the actual demand is sensitive to the sensitivity factor. The
expected demand has been estimated based on the minimum
possible price, according to the previous records of that specific
part. Moreover, the actual demandwould be revealed following
the offers of suppliers.
Dav = min Dex(1− µ),Dmax . (2)
If the firm chooses a single sourcing strategy with the main
supplier, the total long-run average cost includes:
1. Ordering cost based on the part price which is calculated for
the periods without disruption.
2. Lost order costs based on the expected amountwhich cannot
be supplied during disruption, and the lost orders due to
order reduction because of higher procurement prices.
3. Set-up costs for the periods without disruption.
As the negotiation and transaction costs are included in set-
up costs, these costs are imposed just in the periods without
disruption, in which the buyer is working with the supplier. In
this situation, the long-run average cost would be:
Cav = Davcuπ0 + bDavπ1 + bmax{0,Dex − Dav} + Fπ0. (3)
But, if the firm chooses single sourcing from an alternative
supplier, the total long-run average cost includes (1) ordering
cost based on part price, (2) quality cost, (3) lost orders due to
order reduction because of higher procurement prices, and (4)
set-up cost calculated as follows:
Cav = Davcr + qDav + bmax{0,Dex − Dav} + F . (4)
The imposed cost of the best solutions in dual and triple
sourcing should be compared with the cost of single sourcing
by each supplier.
2.2. Dual sourcing
Based on the primary assumption, there are two alternative
sourcing strategies: dual and triple sourcing, each of which has
specific parameters and decision variables. The dual sourcing
parameters are as follows:
w: Supply share of second supplier before
disruption.
cu: Part price before disruption, supplied from
the first source (which is an unreliable
source).
cr : Part price before disruption, supplied from
the second source (which is a reliable source
with lower quality).
cf : Part price after disruption, supplied from
the second source.
δ(i): Constraint of the flexible capacity of an
alternative supplier in period i after
disruption.Attention. The second source may be prevented from supplying
with the cr price after disruption, even for a regular share of
supply, so the problem should be divided into two parts, with
additional assumptions. In other words, the second supplier
supplies the share of w, before disruption, with the price
of cr . In some flexibility formulations, it remains fixed after
disruption and additional demand is supplied at a higher price
(cf ). Sometimes, however, the second supplier will not supply
with its base price after disruption, and increases the price
to cf , so the problem should be solved under two different
conditions. Based on the aim of the model, the formulation can
be categorized into two different scenarios:
1. D-A—The second supplier keeps the price of the share of w
on cr , and supplies additional demand with the price of cf ;
2. D-B—The second supplier increases the price of the whole
demand to cf .
In addition, based on the assumptions of b < cf or b ≥ cf , four
sub-scenarios (D-A-1 and D-B-1; D-A-2 and D-B-2) merge here,
respectively. In all scenarios of dual and triple sourcing, average
demand and price sensitivity factors are computed based on
Eqs. (1) and (2). But, the average part price would be different
for each.
The two scenarios of (D-A-1) and (D-B-1) are the same,
because under the condition of b < cf , lost order costs are less
than the imposed costs of rerouting, and the firm prefers to lose
the order rather than to be supplied from the flexible capacity
of the second supplier. Hence, the question is how to determine
the share of each supplier before disruption, which will remain
fixed after disruption for the alternative supplier. In both (D-A-
1) and (D-B-1), the decision is similar and the long-run average
cost (Cav), which should be minimized, is:
CavD-A-1,D-B-1 = wDavcr + (1− w)Davπ0cu
+wDavq+ (1− w)Davπ1b
+ bmax{0,Dex − Dav}
+ [1− w]+Fπ0 + [w]+ F , (5)
whereDav andµ can be estimated based on Eqs. (1) and (2), and
c¯ is achieved through:
c¯ = (1− w)cu + wcr . (6)
For two scenarios of D-A-2 and D-B-2, the whole demand after
disruption will be supplied from the second supplier because of
b ≥ cf . The long-run average cost for D-A-2, which should be
minimized under the circumstance of probability of disruption,
is:
CavD-A-2 = wDavcr + (1− w)Davπ0cu
+ (min{(1− w), δ(i)})avDavπ1cf
+ (min{(1− w), δ(i)})avDavπ1q
+wDavq+ (1− w)Davbπ1
− (min{(1− w), δ(i)})avDavbπ1
+ bmax{0,Dex − Dav}
+ [1− w]+Fπ0 + [w]+F , (7)
where:
c¯ = (1− w)cuπ0 + wcr + wavf cfπ1. (8)
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will be:
CavD-B-2 = wDavπ0cr + (1− w)Davπ0cu + wDavπ1cf
+ (min{(1− w), δ(i)})avDavπ1cf
+ (min{(1− w), δ(i)})avDavπ1q
+wDavq+ (1− w)Davbπ1
− (min{(1− w), δ(i)})avDavbπ1
+ bmax{0,Dex − Dav}
+ [1− w]+Fπ0 + [w]+ F , (9)
and:
c¯ = (1− w)cuπ0 + wcrπ0 + wcfπ1 + wavf cfπ1. (10)
The aim of the introduced model is to minimize the expected
cost, while there are some constraints on the acceptable share
of each supplier. In addition to the constraint on the flexible
capacity of the alternative supplier, which determines the
maximum acceptable share for the alternative seller after
disruption, there is also another constraint on the minimum
acceptable share for each supplier, as running the production
line for less than the specific rate of product is not economically
viable. Moreover, it is obvious that minimum expected cost will
be gainedwhen theprobability of disruption is zero and the firm
is single-sourced by themain supplier, because there is just one
set-up cost and less part price. So, if disruption does not occur
and the firm remains singly sourced by the main supplier, the
expected cost would be its base cost (Λ). If it shifts to single
sourcing from the alternative supplier, the expected cost would
be (Λ+∆). So, the company always believes that additional cost
equal to∆will be imposed if it shifts to single sourcing from an
alternative supplier and disruption does not occur.
In addition, if the company chooses the second supplier as
its sole source where disruption does not occur, and it wants
to return to the main source, the renegotiating cost and time
should be added to the regular cost. This cost is, most of the
time, a percentage of fixed cost. Let us assume that this ratio
is α, so the expected additional cost would be the summation
of these two costs which is called ‘‘shifting cost ’’, and can be
calculated as follows:
Shiftingcost = ∆+ αF , (11)
where:
∆ = Cav(w=1,π1=0) − Cav(w=0,π1=0). (12)
Consequently, the acceptable answer for a dual sourcing
strategy would be gained through the following NLP model:
min Cav(w), (13)
s.t.
∆+ αF ≥ Cav(w) − Cav(w=0), (14)
Dav = min{Dex(1− µ),Dmax}, (15)
θ2 < w < 1− θ1, (16)
0 < w < 1, (17)
0 < wavf ≤ (1− w), (18)
where θ1 and θ2 are the minimum acceptable shares for the
main and alternative supplier.2.3. Triple sourcing
While there are numerous papers on single/dual sourc-
ing [10,28,32,33], to find the proper answer for the best number
of suppliers, only a few researchers have worked on multiple
sourcing [26,34] and its mathematical formulations [35]. Most
of the companies prefer to reduce thenumber of suppliers to de-
crease the material supplying cost by omitting the unnecessary
set-up and negotiation costs. Hence, the dominant strategies
are single and dual sourcing. When the risk of supplier default
is high, companies tend to dual source, but what if one supplier
goes down and the remaining one causes serious problem. due
to its position as a single source? Problems ofmonopoly are cru-
cial when, because of political instability or the high bargain-
ing power of the seller, the buyer firm should accept especial
contract conditions to receive the parts. For example, the sup-
plier may put the issue of a continuing relationship based on
the stability of environmental and political issues in the con-
tract, which lets them renegotiate or terminate the contract
in the case of mentioned situations. One possible solution for
this problem is to set a sourcing strategy on triple sourcing,
which causes competition between two alternative suppliers,
and brings down the probability of renegotiation. In addition,
this strategy leads to price competition, to prevent price aug-
mentation. Consequently, even if triple sourcing increases the
set-up costs, it reduces the risk of monopoly problems, and as
a part of strategic decision making on the number of suppliers,
this option should also be explored. In addition to the overall
defined variables and parameters, the triple sourcing parame-
ters are as follows:
wu: Supply share of the main (unreliable)
supplier before disruption.
wr1: Supply share of the first alternative supplier
before disruption.
wr2: Supply share of the second alternative
supplier before disruption.
wf 1: Additional supply share of the first
alternative supplier after disruption.
wf 2: Additional supply share of the second
alternative supplier after disruption.
cu: Part price before disruption, supplied from
the main source (which is an unreliable
source).
cr1: Part price before disruption, supplied from
the first alternative source (which is a
reliable source with lower quality).
cr2: Part price before disruption, supplied from
the second alternative source (which is a
reliable source with lower quality).
cf 1: Part price after disruption, supplied from
the first alternative source.
cf 2: Part price after disruption, supplied from
the second alternative source.
δ1(i): Constraint of the flexible capacity of the first
alternative supplier in period i after
disruption.
δ2(i): Constraint of the flexible capacity of the
second alternative supplier in period i after
disruption.
In a similar way to the previous option (dual sourcing),
alternative sources may prevent supplying with their normal
price after disruption, even for a regular share of supplying, so
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assumptions:
1. Alternative suppliers supply the shares of wr1 and wr2,
before disruption, with the prices of cr1 and cr2, respectively,
which remain fixed after disruption, and additional demand
is supplied with a higher price (cf 1 and cf 2);
2. Alternative suppliers will not supply with their base price
after disruption, and increase the price to cf 1 and cf 2.
So, the problem should be solved under two different condi-
tions: (1) T-A and (2) T-B, which may form 4 different sub-
scenarios for each, based on the assumption of b < cf 1, cf 2 or
b ≥ cf 1, cf 2 or cf 1 ≤ b < cf 2 or cf 2 ≤ b < cf 1. These assump-
tions represent T-A-1 and T-B-1; T-A-2 and T-B-2; T-A-3 and
T-B-3; T-A-4 and T-B-4, respectively.
With similar reasoning in dual sourcing for D-A-1 and D-B-
1, T-A-1 and T-B-1 in triple sourcing have the same formulation
as well. The total long-run average cost for eight possible
situations would be as follows, where the share of the main
source iswu = 1− wr1 − wr2:
Total long-run average cost for T-A-1 and T-B-1=
CavT-A-1,T-B-1 = wr1Davcr1 + wr2Davcr2 + wuDavπ0cu
+ (1− wu)Davq+ wuDavπ1b
+ bmax{0,Dex − Dav} + [1− wr1 − wr2]+Fπ0
+ [wr1]+F + [wr2]+F , (19)
and:
c¯ = wucu + wr1cr1 + wr2cr2. (20)
Total long-run average cost for T-A-2=
CavT-A-2 = wr1Davcr1 + wr2Davcr2 + wuDavπ0cu
+wavf 1Davπ1cf 1 + wavf 2Davπ1cf 2
+ (1− wu)Davq+ wavf 1Davπ1q
+wavf 2Davπ1q+ wuDavπ1b− wavf 1Davπ1b
−wavf 2Davπ1b+ bmax{0,Dex − Dav}
+ [1− wr1 − wr2]+Fπ0 + [wr1]+F + [wr2]+F , (21)
and:
c¯ = wucuπ0 + wr1cr1 + wr2cr2 + wavf 1cf 1π1 + wavf 2cf 2π1. (22)
Total long-run average cost for T-A-3=
CavT-A-3 = wr1Davcr1 + wr2Davcr2 + wuDavπ0cu
+wavf 1Davπ1cf 1 + wavf 1Davπ1q+ (1− wu)Davq
+ (wuDav − wavf 1Dav)π1b+ bmax{0,Dex − Dav}
+ [1− wr1 − wr2]+Fπ0 + [wr1]+F + [wr2]+F , (23)
and:
c¯ = wucuπ0 + wr1cr1 + wr2cr2 + wavf 1cf 1π1. (24)
Total long-run average cost for T-A-4=
CavT-A-4 = wr1Davcr1 + wr2Davcr2 + wuDavπ0cu
+wavf 2Davπ1cf 2 + wavf 2Davπ1q+ (1− wu)Davq
+ bmax{0,Dex − Dav} + (wuDav − wavf 2Dav)π1b
+ [1− wr1 − wr2]+Fπ0 + [wr1]+F + [wr2]+F , (25)
and:
c¯ = wucuπ0 + wr1cr1 + wr2cr2 + wavf 2cf 2π1. (26)Total long-run average cost for T-B-2=
CavT-B-2 = wr1Davπ0cr1 + wr2Davπ0cr2
+wuDavπ0cu + wr1Davπ1cf 1 + wavf 1Davπ1cf 1
+wr2Davπ1cf 2 + wavf 2Davπ1cf 2 + wr1Davq
+wr2Davq+ wavf 1Davπ1q+ wavf 2Davπ1q
+Davπ1b− wr1Davπ1b+ wr2Davπ1b
−wavf 1Davπ1b− wavf 2Davπ1b
+ bmax{0,Dex − Dav} + [1− wr1 − wr2]+Fπ0
+ [wr1]+F + [wr2]+F , (27)
and:
c¯ = wucuπ0 + wr1cr1π0 + wr2cr2π0
+ (wavf 1 + wr1)cf 1π1 + (wavf 2 + wr2)cf 2π1. (28)
Total long-run average cost for T-B-3=
CavT-B-3 = wr1Davπ0cr1 + wr2Davcr2 + wuDavπ0cu
+wavf 1Davπ1cf 1 + (wr1Davπ0 + wr2Dav)q
+wavf 1Davπ1q+ (Dav(1− wr2)− wavf 1Dav)π1b
+ bmax{0,Dex − Dav} + [1− wr1 − wr2]+Fπ0
+ [wr1]+F + [wr2]+F , (29)
and:
c¯ = wucuπ0 + wr1cr1π0 + wr2cr2
+wr1cf 1π1 + wavf 1cf 1π1. (30)
Total long-run average cost for T-B-4=
CavT-B-4 = wr1Davcr1 + wr2Davπ0cr2 + wuDavπ0cu
+wavf 2Davπ1cf 2 + wavf 2Davπ1q+ (wr1Dav
+wr2Davπ0)q+ ((1− wr1)− wavf 2)Davπ1b
+ bmax{0,Dex − Dav} + [1− wr1 − wr2]+Fπ0
+ [wr1]+F + [wr2]+F , (31)
and:
c¯ = wucuπ0 + wr1cr1 + wr2cr2π0
+wr2cf 2π1 + wavf 2cf 2π1. (32)
Similar to a dual sourcing strategy, in triple sourcing options,
there are some limitations on the minimum acceptable share
of each supplier and maximum acceptable additional costs in
comparison with shifting cost. Moreover, there exists another
limitation on the additional share of alternative suppliers (wf 1
and wf 2), which should be entered in the set of constraints for
the triple sourcingmodel,while in dual sourcing, it is possible to
merge this limitation in the objective function. The formulation
of this constraint is different for each scenario, and the NLP
model is as follows:
min Cav(wr1,wr2,wavf 1 ,wavf 2 )
, (33)
s.t.
∆+ αF ≥ Cav
(wr1,wr2,w
av
f 1,w
av
f 2)
− Cav
(wr1,wr2,w
av
f 1,w
av
f 2=0)
/for all scenarios/, (34)
θ1 ≤ 1− wr1 − wr2 /for all scenarios/, (35)
θ2 ≤ wr1, /for all scenarios/, (36)
θ3 ≤ wr2 /for all scenarios/, (37)
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Parts Single and dual sourcing Triple sourcing q c0 b Dex Dmax F
cu cr cf cr1 cr2 cf 1 cf 2
I 91.42 91 120 87.14 90 115 110 5 89 100 90000 120000 180000
II 50 42 45 40 42 45 42 12 50 70 45000 52500 90000
III 74.9 71 72 70 69 72 85 7 75 80 52500 90000 105000
IV 70 57 100 57 58 100 74 15 70 85 14000 20000 28000
V 80 72 75 72 71 75 75 14 80 110 12000 24000 24000
VI 40 36 36 36 33 36 55 10 40 50 42000 75000 84000
VII 18 16 30 16 17 30 20 3 18 28 125000 170000 160000Dav = min{Dex(1− µ),Dmax} /for all scenarios/, (38)
wf 1(i) = min{1− wr1 − wr2, δ1(i)}
/for the scenario of T-A-3 and T-B-3/, (39)
wf 2(i) = min{1− wr1 − wr2, δ2(i)}
/for the scenario of T-A-4 and T-B-4/, (40)
wf 1(i) ≤ min{1− wr1 − wr2, δ1(i)}
/for the scenario of T-A-2 and T-B-2/, (41)
wf 2(i) ≤ min{1− wr1 − wr2, δ2(i)}
/for the scenario of T-A-2 and T-B-2/, (42)
wavf 1 = (min{1− wr1 − wr2, δ1(i)})av
/for the scenario of T-A-3 and T-B-3/, (43)
wavf 2 = (min{1− wr1 − wr2, δ2(i)})av
/for the scenario of T-A-4 and T-B-4/, (44)
wavf 1 ≤ (min{1− wr1 − wr2, δ1(i)})av
/for the scenario of T-A-2 and T-B-2/, (45)
wavf 2 ≤ (min{1− wr1 − wr2, δ2(i)})av
/for the scenario of T-A-2 and T-B-2/, (46)
wf 1(i)+ wf 2(i) ≤ 1− wr1 − wr2
/for all scenarios/, (47)
0 < wr1, wr2 < 1 /for all scenarios/, (48)
0 ≤ wf 1(i), wf 2(i), wavf 1, wavf 2 < 1
/for all scenarios/ (49)
where wf 1(i) and wf 2(i) are the additional share of alternative
suppliers in period (i). Each constraint of Relations 37–45
should be decomposed to two separate constraints to make
this model a LP model. As δ1(i) and δ2(i) may follow different
patterns for each case (e.g. a linear function or stepwise
pattern based on i), consequently, the values of wavf 1 and w
av
f 2
(average additional share of the alternative suppliers) should
be formulated and calculated based on wf 1(i) and wf 2(i) and
the special condition of that specific case. This issue will be
illustrated in the next section for the studied supply chain.
3. Empirical study
The empirical case study of this paper has been done in the
context of sanctions, while there are several trade barriers in
supplier-manufacturer relationships. The investigated supply
chain is in the automotive industry in Iran. The critical parts
can be supplied from unreliable high quality and reliable low
quality suppliers, the latter of which are not acceptable under
normal situations because of imposed extra quality-costs and
additional set-up costs.Table 2: Related scenarios to each part.
Parts Dual sourcing scenarios Triple sourcing scenarios
I D-A-1, D-B-1 T-A-1, T-B-1
II D-A-2 T-A-2
III D-A-2 T-A-3
IV D-A-1 T-A-4
V D-B-2 T-B-2
VI D-B-2 T-B-3
VII D-B-1 T-B-4
The addressed model is exactly based on real scenarios of
sourcing in the studied case. In order to check the validity
of the proposed mathematical formulation, the process of
development has been accompanied by practitioner ideas
to reflect reality and, also, complementary statistical tests.
Moreover, some parts with the similar problem of the
illustrated situation have been chosen to check the validity
and verification of the model. In the following demonstrated
examples, all applied data are based on reality.
Based on the introduced triple sourcing options, seven cat-
egories of parts can be discussed. Each of these triple sourcing
options should be compared with appropriate scenarios of dual
and single sourcing. Consequently, the information of seven dif-
ferent parts has been applied to clarify the procedure and impli-
cation of the proposed model. The value of basic parameters is
exhibited in Table 1; each part reflects the characteristics of one
triple sourcing scenario and its relevant dual and single sourc-
ing solutions. Moreover, Table 2 reveals the related dual and
triple sourcing strategies of each part.
All prices are based on the real values in the studied supply
chain. c0 has been set according to the price of the previous
contract or the estimated price based on which the demand
had been planned ahead. The previous procedure of supplier
selection had just considered the minimum offered price, so
the imposed cost of low quality and lost order costs have been
never accumulated in either international or local purchasing
departments. Consequently, the applied information should
be gathered from decentralized departments (international
purchasing department, local purchasing department, quality
management division and financial economics division). Hence,
the value of q is estimated based on the ratio of reworks/broken
parts in two levels: before usage of the part (was achieved
through the records of quality control before production line),
and along the production line (was gained through the records
of quality control stations along the production line). The
production of this ratio to the part price reflects the value of q.
The financial economics division reports the cost of a one
minute production line stop and the imposed cost of unutilized
resources, including human resources, production capacity and
warehouses. According to these two categories of cost and the
production rate of each product, which contains each studied
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The planning horizon after disruption is one year, as the
contracts are arranged annually. There are six ordering periods
per year and, due to the capability of the alternative supplier for
additional demand, the additional capacity constraint for each
period – δ(i) – should be investigated.
It is noted that the value of all parameters is based on real
cases except δ(i), whichwas established upon the estimation of
practitioners. For the first alternative supplier, it was assumed
as:
δ1(1) = δ1(2) = δ1(3) = 0.4, δ1(4) = δ1(5) = 0.6,
δ1(6) = 0.8,
and for the second alternative supplier as:
δ2(1) = δ2(2) = 0.3, δ2(3) = δ2(4) = 0.6,
δ2(5) = δ2(6) = 0.8,
for all scenarios.
Consider part II, which can be supplied by alternative
suppliers if a disruption strikes. This part can be supplied from
the main source with the price of cu = 50 e, where there is
also an alternative supplier with the offer of cr = 42 e. But,
it imposes an additional quality-cost of q = 12 e per part.
Consequently, based on Eqs. (1)–(3), the average demand and
expected average cost of single sourcing from a main supplier
would be:
Dav = 45000, (50)
Cav(w=0) = 10000(225π0 + 315π1 + 9π0). (51)
Based on Eqs. (1), (2) and (4), the average demand and expected
average cost of single sourcing from an alternative supplier
would be:
Dav = 52500, (52)
Cav(w=1) = 2908800. (53)
If the main supplier is disrupted, due to the problem of
sanctions, the alternative supplier can provide the company
withmore parts at the price of cf = 45e. If each unmet demand
imposes the cost of b = 70 e as lost order costs, and set-
up cost would be F = 90,000 e for each contract period, the
expected demand per period isDex = 45,000 and theminimum
acceptable share of each supplier is θ1 = 0.5 and θ2 = 0.2 and
α = 0.3. Due to the mentioned additional capacity constraints,
the average additional share of an alternative supplier after
disruption would be:
wavf = (min{(1− w), δ(i)})av
=

i
wf (i)
6
3min{(1− w), 0.4}
+2min{(1− w), 0.6}
+min{(1− w), 0.8}

6
. (54)
Based on the illustrated parameters, the model signifies D-A-2,
and its NLP model would be as follows for any given π1, where
L represents the lost orders due to order reduction, because of
the price sensitivity factor:
min(Cav
(w,wavf )
) = (1− w)(1− π1)Dav50+ wDav42
+wavf Davπ145+ wDav12+ wavf Davπ112
+ (1− w − wavf )Davπ170+ L70
+ (1− π1)90000+ 90000, (55)s.t.
wavf =
3wf (1)+ 2wf (4)+ wf (6)
6
, (56)
wf (1) ≤ 1− w, (57)
wf (1) ≤ 0.4, (58)
wf (4) ≤ 1− w, (59)
wf (4) ≤ 0.6, (60)
wf (6) ≤ 1− w, (61)
wf (6) ≤ 0.8, (62)
w ≤ 0.5, (63)
0.2 ≤ w, (64)
(1− w)(1− π1)Dav50+ wDav42+ wavf Davπ145
+wDav12+ wavf Davπ112
+ (1− w − wavf )Davπ170+ L70
+ (1− π1)90000+ 90000− Cav(w=0) ≤ 453293, (65)
Cav(w=0) = 10000(225(1− π1)+ 315π1 + 9(1− π1)), (66)
Dav ≤ 45000(1− (50(1− w)(1− π1)+ 42w
+ 45(1− w)π1 − 50)/50), (67)
45000− Dav ≤ L, (68)
Dav ≤ 52500, (69)
L,Dav, w,wavf , wf (1), wf (4), wf (6) > 0. (70)
In addition to dual sourcing options, there is the triple sourcing
option, which leads to competition between two alternative
suppliers and a reduction in part prices. The values of the
introduced parameters for part II have been shown in Table 1,
and the NLP model of triple sourcing for any given π1 is
formulated as:
min Cav
(wr1,wr2,w
av
f 1,w
av
f 2)
= wuDavπ050+ wr1Dav40
+wr2Dav42+ wavf 1Davπ145+ wavf 2Davπ142
+ (1− wu)Dav12+ wavf 1Davπ112
+wavf 2Davπ112+ wuDavπ170
−wavf 1Davπ170− wavf 2Davπ170
+ 70L+ 90000π0 + 2× 90000, (71)
wavf 1 =
3wf 1(1)+ 2wf 1(4)+ wf 1(6)
6
, (72)
wf 1(1) ≤ wu, (73)
wf 1(1) ≤ 0.4, (74)
wf 1(4) ≤ wu, (75)
wf 1(4) ≤ 0.6, (76)
wf 1(6) ≤ wu, (77)
wf 1(6) ≤ 0.8, (78)
wavf 2 =
2wf 2(1)+ 2wf 2(3)+ 2wf 2(5)
6
, (79)
wf 2(1) ≤ wu, (80)
wf 2(1) ≤ 0.3, (81)
wf 2(3) ≤ wu, (82)
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wf 2(5) ≤ wu, (84)
wf 2(5) ≤ 0.8, (85)
wf 1(1)+ wf 2(1) ≤ wu, (86)
wf 1(1)+ wf 2(3) ≤ wu, (87)
wf 1(4)+ wf 2(3) ≤ wu, (88)
wf 1(4)+ wf 2(5) ≤ wu, (89)
wf 1(6)+ wf 2(6) ≤ wu, (90)
wr1 + wr2 < 1, (91)
0.2 ≤ wr1, (92)
0.2 ≤ wr2, (93)
0.5 ≤ 1− wr1 − wr2, (94)
wuDavπ050+ wr1Dav40+ wr2Dav42
+wavf 1Davπ145+ wavf 2Davπ142
+ (1− wu)Dav12+ wavf 1Davπ112
+wavf 2Davπ112+ wuDavπ170
−wavf 1Davπ170− wavf 2Davπ170+ 70L
+ 90000π0 + 2× 90000− Cav(w=0) ≤ 453293, (95)
Cav(w=0) = 10000(225(1− π1)+ 315π1 + 9(1− π1)), (96)
Dav ≤ 45000(1− (wuπ050+ wr140+ wr242
+wavf 1π145+ wavf 2π142− 50)/50), (97)
45000− Dav ≤ L, (98)
Dav ≤ 52500, (99)
Dav, L, wr1, wr2, wavf 1, w
av
f 2, wf 1(1), wf 1(4),
wf 1(6), wf 2(1), wf 2(4) > 0. (100)
Table 3 exhibits the optimal answer for any givenπ1. Moreover,
this table contains long-run average costs for single sourcing
from the main and alternative supplier. According to the
specific feature of the price sensitivity factor, the rival scenarios
of sourcing have different average demands. So, in order to
rationalize expected cost comparison, the ratio of ‘‘average
expected cost/average demand’’ should be calculated, which
represents the total cost of purchasing per unit (Table 4).
If the company chooses single sourcing from the alternative
supplier, itmay lose future opportunities toworkwith themain
supplier. So, most of the time, the studied company insists on
having a connection with the main supplier, even though it
may create additional costs. In such cases, there is a so called
‘‘affordable extra cost’’ which is a ratio of theminimumpossible
cost of being single sourced by an alternative supplier. This ratio
is 10% in the studied case. Hence, when the minimum possible
cost is achieved through working with an alternative supplier
as a sole source, the final decision should be made, regarding
this extra affordable cost. For instance, according to Table 4,
when the probability of disruption is 0.3, Cav(w = 1) = 55.72
offers the minimum expected cost per unit. But, a comparison
between ‘‘Cav(w = 1)+ affordable extra cost ’’ and the optimal
dual sourcing option, reveals that dual sourcing is the most
appropriate sourcing strategy.
If the decision making process is done when the probability
of disruption is 0.5, the offered strategy is triple sourcing. But
this part is the most complicated one among the studied parts;
as by increasing disruption probability, the optimal strategy ischanged three times: single sourcing→ dual sourcing→ triple
sourcing→ dual sourcing.
It is obvious that when the probability of disruption for this
part is more than 0.3, single sourcing is not an appropriate
option. So, if the decision making process is done when the
probability is more than 0.3, single sourcing is the loser, and
the dominant strategy would be dual sourcing. Even when the
model offers triple sourcing as a better option, there is just a
fine difference between dual and triple sourcing imposed costs.
4. Practical implication
In order to show the trustworthiness of the addressed
models, seven different parts with the characteristics of each
introduced scenario have been investigated, and the models
have been run for different probabilities of disruption to
explore the progress of discovering suitable sourcing strategies.
Regarding the possible sourcing options and probability of
disruptions, 280 different models have been run; the outcome
is exhibited in Table 4.
According to Table 4, when the probability of disruption is
high, dual or triple sourcing is the dominant strategy in most
cases. In order to find out whether this claim stands on reality
or not, ANOVA tests are done to compare situations in which
each strategy of sourcing is optimal. Moreover, homogeneity
of variance, Brown–Forsythe, and Welch and Games–Howell
tests have also been done to complete the interpretation of
the ANOVA test. Three main sourcing strategies of single, dual
and triple sourcing have been investigated in the addressed
model, so, there are three main groups for the ANOVA test.
The significance value, comparing the groups (optimal sourcing
strategy), has been achieved equal to 0.03 which is less than
0.05. So, the null hypothesis (indifferences among sourcing
strategies based on the probability of disruption) can be
rejected.
The significance value for homogeneity of the variances test
is <0.05. So, the variances of the groups are significantly dif-
ferent. In order to trust the ANOVA test result, Brown–Forsythe
andWelch tests have been done, as their significance values are
both <0.05. So, the null hypothesis can still be rejected. How-
ever, this result does not tell us which groups are responsible
for the difference. According to the result of the homogeneity
of variance test, the appropriate test at this level would be the
Games–Howell test. The outcome of this test shows that with
the significance level of 0.05, the group of single sourcing is dif-
ferent from the groups of dual and triple sourcing, with proba-
bility of disruption.
The total cost of procurement includes ordering, quality,
lost orders and set up costs. Ordering, quality and lost order
cost are sensitive to the optimal strategy and share of each
supplier. But according to the results of the studied parts, setup
cost is an independent factor, which may have meaningful
influence on the final optimal sourcing strategy. In order to
find out whether this impact is significant or not, a one-way
ANOVA test has been run among groups of sourcing strategies
(single, dual and triple sourcing), where the tested variable
is the ratio of ‘‘setup cost/minimum possible cost’’. Similar to
the test of probability, the ANOVA test has been accompanied
by homogeneity of variance, Brown–Forsythe, and Welch and
Games–Howell tests. The significance value of the ANOVA test
is 0.018, which implies the rejection of indifference among
groups. Results of Brown–Forsythe andWelch tests also confirm
the ANOVA test. According to the Games–Howell test, the
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π1 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
Cav(w = 0) 2421000 2502000 2583000 2664000 2745000 2826000 2907000 2988000 3069000
Opt-dual 2 590872 2643245 2696270 2749949 2804280 2843550 2871858 2896128 2920584
Dav(dual) 46800 47160 47520 47880 48240 49500 50175 50400 50625
w 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5
Opt-triple 2 764894 2790132 2815602 2841303 2867236 2893400 2919796 2946424 2973284
Dav(Triple) 48591 48942 49293 49644 49995 50346 50697 51048 51399
wr1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
wr2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Cav(w = 0) = 2908800, Cav(w = 1)+ aff∗ = 3199680, Dav(w = 0) = 45000,Dav(w = 1) = 52500 *aff: affordable extra cost.Table 4: The minimum final purchasing cost per unit for each scenario.
π1
0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
Cav(w = 0) 96.9 97.6 98.2 98.9 99.5 100.2 100.8 101.5 102.1
Opt-dual 99.6 100.1 100.6 101.1 101.5 – – – –
Part I w 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 – – – –
Cav(w = 1) = 100.34 Opt-triple 98.7 98.9 99.2 99.4 99.6 99.8 100.1 100.3 100.5
Cav(w = 1)+ aff∗ = 110.38 wr1 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
wr2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Optimal strategy∗∗ S1 S1 S1 S1 S1 T T T T
Cav(w = 0) 53.8 55.6 57.4 59.2 61.0 62.8 64.6 66.4 68.2
Opt-dual 55.4 56.0 56.7 57.4 58.1 57.4 57.2 57.5 57.7
Part II w 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5
Cav(w = 1) = 55.41 Opt-triple 56.9 57.0 57.1 57.2 57.4 57.5 57.6 57.7 57.8
Cav(w = 1)+ aff = 61.30 wr1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
wr2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Optimal strategy S1 S1 D T T D D D D
Cav(w = 0) 77.2 77.5 77.8 78.1 78.4 78.8 79.1 79.4 79.7
Opt-dual 79.6 79.8 79.9 80.1 80.2 80.4 80.5 80.7 80.8
Part III w 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.4
Cav(w = 1) = 79.90 Opt-triple 81.4 – – – – – – – –
Cav(w = 1)+ aff = 87.89 wr1 0.2 – – – – – – – –
wr2 0.2 – – – – – – – –
Optimal strategy S1 S1 S1 S1 S1 S1 S1 S1 S1
Cav(w = 0) 73.3 74.6 75.9 77.2 78.5 79.8 81.1 82.4 83.7
Opt-dual 75.3 76.3 77.3 78.3 79.3 80.3 81.3 82.3 83.3
Part IV w 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Cav(w = 1) = 73.69 Opt-triple 77.5 78.5 79.4 79.8 80.5 81.3 82.2 83.0 83.7
Cav(w = 1)+ aff = 81.06 wr1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2
wr2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3
Optimal strategy S1 S1 S1 S1 S1 S1 S2 S2 S2
Cav(w = 0) 84.8 87.6 90.4 93.2 96.0 98.8 101.6 104.4 107.2
Opt-dual 86.2 87.5 88.3 88.8 89.3 89.8 90.3 90.8 91.3
Part V w 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Cav(w = 1) = 87.82 Opt-triple 88.4 88.9 89.4 89.9 90.4 90.8 91.3 91.8 92.3
Cav(w = 1)+ aff = 96.90 wr1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
wr2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Optimal strategy S1 D D D D D D D D
Cav(w = 0) 42.8 43.6 44.4 45.2 46.0 46.8 47.6 48.4 49.2
Opt-dual 45.5 45.8 47.0 47.6 47.8 48.0 48.3 48.5 48.7
Part VI w 0.2 0.2 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Cav(w = 1) = 47.82 Opt-triple 47.7 47.9 48.1 48.7 48.9 49.1 49.3 49.5 49.7
Cav(w = 1)+ aff = 52.60 wr1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
wr2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
Optimal strategy S1 S1 S1 S1 S1 S1 S1 S1 D
Cav(w = 0) 20.2 21.0 21.9 22.8 23.6 24.5 25.4 26.3 27.1
Opt-dual 21.4 22.1 22.7 22.4 22.8 23.2 23.6 24.0 24.3
Part VII w 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5
Cav(w = 1) = 20.15 Opt-triple 22.6 22.9 23.3 23.5 23.8 24.1 24.3 24.6 24.8
Cav(w = 1)+ aff = 22.17 wr1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
wr2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3
Optimal strategy S1 S1 S1 S2 S2 S2 S2 S2 S2
*aff: affordable extra cost.
**Optimal strategy: S1: Single sourcing from the main supplier, S2: Single sourcing from the alternative supplier, D: Dual sourcing, T: Triple sourcing.
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investigated ratio is significantly different in single sourcing in
comparison to dual and triple sourcing.
This result can also be endorsed by having a glance
at Figure 2; it is obvious that regardless of the divergent
characteristics of studied parts, when the ratio of ‘‘setup
cost/minimum possible cost’’ is more than 0.04, the optimal
sourcing strategy is single sourcing.
5. Conclusion
This paper investigated sourcing strategies (single/dual/
triple sourcing) in a single product setting. According to the
potential problems of sanctions, one supplier has an unreliable
capacity, while other suppliers are reliable but have lower
product quality. Sanctions have been a serious problem for
different countries during the last century. It may cause
a failure of supply from unreliable sources. The important
question which emerges here is: ‘‘How can companies apply
different sourcing strategies to handle potential disruptions of
sanctions?’’ Sanctions have specific features which should be
considered in the decision making process.
One accepted solution in literature dealing with sourcing
problems is the modification of sourcing strategies in proper
time. According to the special context of this paper, the main
problems of sanctions occur when the company is single
sourced from one supplier, which is likely to prevent the
company from continuing the supply process. Hence, in this
study dual and triple sourcing strategies, as solutions to handle
the situation, are addressed and compared; the former with
lower setup costs, but a high probability of future problems due
to monopoly, and the latter with higher setup costs, but price
competition after disruption.
The main assumption in this work is the possibility of
rerouting supplies from amain supplier to alternative suppliers
after disruption. In this case, the alternative suppliers should
apply their flexible capacity of production or increase their
capacity. Consequently, they may have limitations on the
possible amount of rerouted supply or they need some time to
increase their capacity. In order to support this limitation, one
capacity function has been entered to the model.
The introducedmodels have been illustrated in an empirical
study of the procurement process of seven different parts in the
automotive industry. The addressed models integrated price
and risk sensitivity to determine the appropriate amount of
demand, which has not been considered in previous works
of disruption management. Moreover, the studied disruption
was sanctions with special features on the length of disruption,
the dynamic nature of its probability and possible solutions
to mitigate its influence. In previous research of supply
chain disruption and sourcing strategies, none of the papers
investigated the real situation with the dominancy of triplesourcing as the best option. The result of our empirical study
revealed how and when triple sourcing can be an optimal
strategy.
In order to find out whether the probability of disruptions
and setup costs (as independent variables) have a significant
influence on the optimal strategy, different statistical tests have
been done (ANOVA, homogeneity of variance, Brown–Forsythe,
Welch and Games–Howell tests). According to the results,
these two variables are determining factors in the proposed
model. But, disruptions do not have any distribution function
to calculate the probability in any given situation. Values
of probability are usually estimated, based on previous
experiences of experts and managers. So, in line with this
study, one possible future research would be development of
a model to estimate the disruption probability for rare events.
This research will absolutely be based on the characteristics of
different disruptions.
Moreover, the proposed models are not just limited by
applications to sanction situation. One similar disruption,
from the view of the behavior of its probability, is supplier
bankruptcy. Before bankruptcy declaration, the probability of
supply failure can be estimated and, if the buyer is aware, it
can plan a substitute supply policy. Such conditions can be
investigated in further research. The proposed model brings
insights into other scenarios where there might be some
opportunities to evaluate the probability of losing a supplier out
of external impact; not only in sanction situations.
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